US History/US History (Bureau Development Inc.)(1991).ISO/dp/0078/00783.txt

Text File | 1990-12-23 | 24KB | 450 lines

$Unique_ID{USH00783}
$Pretitle{77}
$Title{The Amphibians Came to Conquer:  Volume 1
Chapter 9B   The Japanese First Report the Alligator}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Dyer, VAdm. George C.}
$Affiliation{USN}
$Subject{landing
beach
tulagi
japanese
fire
ships
craft
gunfire
area
support}
$Volume{Vol. 1}
$Date{1973}
$Log{}
Book:        The Amphibians Came to Conquer:  Volume 1
Author:      Dyer, VAdm. George C.
Affiliation: USN
Volume:      Vol. 1
Date:        1973

Chapter 9B   The Japanese First Report the Alligator

     Although U.S. ships must have been visible by 0600 and had commenced
firing by 0613, Japanese records indicate that it was not until nearly 40
minutes later, 0652 on 7 August, that Commander Air Base Tulagi got off a
report to Commander 25th Air Flotilla, his senior at Rabaul, that "enemy task
force sighted."

     This message was not nearly so succinct or so immediate as that of
Commander Logan Ramsey, U.S. Navy, Operations Officer on the staff of Patrol
Wing Two at the Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor.  His 0758 message reporting
the 0755 attack by the Japanese on December 7, 1941 read:

     Air Raid Pearl.  This is not a drill.

     It was another 13 minutes before the report of Commander Air Base, Tulagi
was amplified:

     Enemy task force of twenty ships attacking Tulagi, undergoing severe
bombings, landing preparations underway; help requested.

     "Enemy has commenced landing" was reported at 0715.

Tulagi - Gavutu - Florida

     The Japanese forces in the Southern Solomons had moved initially onto
Tulagi Island, primarily because they needed a seaplane base in that area for
aerial reconnaissance in connection with "and subsequent to" Operation "M-O,"
the May 1942 Japanese forward movement which had brought on the Battle of the
Coral Sea.

     Prior to May 1942, the British controlled the Solomon Islands
protectorate from Government House on the northeast side of Tulagi, and the
Australians provided the minor defense forces and "Ferdinand," the highly
effective coast watcher's organization.  On 7 August 1942, "Ferdinand" began
paying extra intelligence dividends.  Based on their information and aerial
photographs, Vice Admiral Ghormley had estimated in his Operation Plan No.
1-42, that some 3,100 Japanese were to be reckoned with at the Marine
objectives.  Interrogation after the war of senior Japanese Army officers
directly concerned with the Lower Solomons indicates this estimate was
excellent and that there were about 780 Japanese including labor troops in the
Tulagi-Gavutu-Tanambogo area and 2,230 on Guadalcanal.  Some 1,700 of the
Guadalcanal contingent were labor troops and the rest largely were Japanese
Marines.

     Since their initial landings, the Japanese had spread out from Tulagi,
which was only about one-half mile wide and two miles long, to the much larger
island of Florida to the immediate north, and to the small hillish islands of
Gavutu and Tanambogo some 3,000 yards to the eastward of Tulagi. The Japanese
had established their seaplane base at Gavutu island, which was reef ringed.

     All this dispersion complicated mightily the Scheme of Maneuver, and the
gunfire support plan for the attacking forces in the Tulagi area.

     Aerial photographs had shown the Japanese defenses were strongest on the
northeast and southeast beaches of Tulagi.  So the southwest beach area was
chosen for the initial main landing.  This gave the landing craft for the main
Blue Beach landing a rudimentary straight approach from the transport area and
a real break.

     To take Gavutu Island, and to land at Halavo Peninsula, Florida island,
to the eastward of Gavutu, a difficult turning operation was required of the
landing craft, in addition to picking a circuitous path through a heavily
reefed area.

Scheme of Maneuver

     During the planning phases, of the approximately 19,500 embarked Marines,
some 11,000 were assigned to the Guadalcanal assault, 4,000 to take Florida,
Tulagi and Gavutu Islands, and the rest composed the Division Reserve, whose
secondary mission was to act as the Ndeni Landing Force in Phase 3 of Task One
of the PESTILENCE Operation, the second phase of which was WATCHTOWER.

     The agreed upon Scheme of Maneuver for Guadalcanal which governed the
amphibians' approach to that enemy-held island was a comparatively simple one
for the untested seagoing amphibians to execute their part.  The Scheme of
Maneuver for Tulagi, Gavutu, Makambo, and Florida was considerably more
complicated from the naval viewpoint, although markedly fewer large transports
and cargo ships were involved.

     The assault beach on Guadalcanal was 1,600 yards of the 2,000-yard wide
Red Beach.  It lay just to the east of the mouth of the Tenaru River and five
miles east of Lunga Point, a good landmark on the north central coastline. The
Japanese air strip was inland a mile, and about half way between Tenaru and
Lunga.

     Nine transports and six cargo ships, Transport Group XRAY, under the
command of the second senior naval officer regularly detailed in the
Amphibious Force South Pacific, Captain Reifsnider, in the Hunter Liggett
(AP-27) were assigned to the Guadalcanal task.  They were to initially anchor
in two lines, 1,500 yards apart, with the inshore line just outside the
hundred fathom curve, four and a half miles north of the mouth of the Tenaru
River.  As soon as the fast minesweepers could sweep the area between the
initial transport area and the 10 fathom line the transports and cargo ships
were to move closer to the beach.

     The main assault beach on Tulagi was 500 yards of the 600-yard wide Blue
Beach.  It lay in the west central sector of the south coast of Tulagi.  An
additional landing was to be made on the east coast of Gavutu Island, and two
small landings at areas five miles apart on Florida Island - Haleta Harbor to
the west and Halavo Peninsula to the east of Tulagi.

     Three transports, four destroyer-type transports and one cargo ship,
Transport Group YOKE, under the command of Captain George B. Ashe, the third
senior officer regularly detailed in the Amphibious Force South Pacific and in
the Neville (AP-16), were assigned to this more complicated task.  They were
to initially anchor southwest of Blue Beach, with the inshore line just
outside the hundred fathom curve which in this case again was about five miles
from the beach.

     Groups XRAY and YOKE were initially anchored about 11 miles apart.

     The Lines of departure from where the assault landing craft were to
initiate their run for the shore in formal formation were two and a half miles
from the designated beaches, both Red and Blue.  About two-thirds of the
Marines were embarked in the 36-foot Higgins boat, the LCP(L) (Landing Craft,
Personnel without ramp) and about one-third in the newer LCV or LCPR with the
highly desirable ramp.  Tanks and trucks were to be ferried ashore in medium-
sized landing craft, the 45-foot LCM's.

     After the first two days of rehearsal at Koro island, and its
accompanying routine landing mishaps and engine failures, the large transports
and cargo ships of Task Force 62 had been told to signal the number of landing
craft each would have available and ready for the WATCHTOWER landing.  To this
was added the number anticipated to be available from the Zeilin and
Betelgeuse and the four LCP (L) in each of the four destroyer transports.  The
grand total listed was 475 consisting of:

     (a) 8 "X" Type (30-foot personnel craft without ramp).

(b) 303 LCP(L) (36-foot Landing Craft, Personnel, without ramp).

     (c) 116 LCV or LCPR (36-foot Landing Craft Vehicle, Personnel, with
ramp).

     (d) 48 LCM (45-foot Landing Craft, Medium, for tanks and trucks, with
ramp).

None of the landing craft were really old and most had been built within the
year.  The eight oldest type landing craft in the WATCHTOWER Operation were
the 30-foot "X boats," four in the flagship McCawley and four in the Barnett
(AP-11).  The LVT's (amtracs) of the Amphibian Tractor Battalion of the First
Marine Division were in addition to the craft listed above.

     On 22 June 1942, COMINCH had changed the designations of many of the
landing boats, but his written order was circulated by slow sea mail to the
South Pacific, and was not passed on to Task Force 62 until mid-August, so
that the official reports of this period all use the earlier designations. The
36-foot "TR boats" with ramp, officially became LCV, but popularly known as
LCPR; "T boats" without ramp became LCP(L) and the 45-foot "WL lighters"
became LCM.  The LCP(L) had diesel engines, but all the LCV or LCPR in
WATCHTOWER were gas engine craft, as were part of the LCM.

Away All Boats

     It was 0615 on 7 August 1942 and time for the landing craft to go to
work.  The boatswain's mates' shrill pipes and the crane operator's skillful
control would soon fill the warm, calm and apathetic anchorage areas with
landing craft.  It had taken the Navy a very long eight months since 7
December 1941 to put a full Marine division into position before enemy held
islands.  It was the first time in the war that the confident Marines were in
a position to make the Japanese start looking over their shoulders to note how
far they had to retreat to reach either their ancestors or their homeland in
Honshu or Kyushu.  It was a moment of pride for the amphibians.

     At 0637, CTF 62.2 (Captain Ashe) on the Tulagi side had really sent the
amphibians to their tasks when he executed the General Signal "Land Landing
Force, Zero Hour is 0800."  Since the Marines wished one rifle company,
reinforced by one machine gun platoon, landed on Florida island at Haleta to
the westward of Blue Beach on Tulagi at H minus 20 minutes, or at 0740,
Captain Ashe's landing schedule was barely off to a good start.  It was not
until 0652 that Rear Admiral Turner off Lunga Point executed the same General
Signal, but set Hypo Hour for the Guadalcanal landings considerably later, at
0910.  Captain Reifsnider's transports had lagged markedly in coming into
position, and H-hour at Guadalcanal was 40 minutes later Than planned.

     Admiral Turner thought that it was a tribute to the basic competence of
the boatswain's mates and coxswains manning the 475 rapidly trained and
partially rehearsed landing craft, as well as to the soundness of the training
guidance received from the many echelons of command above them, that these
sailormen put the Marines ashore on the right beaches at the appointed hour in
the WATCHTOWER Operation.  His hat was off to the sailormen and young officers
of his command, many of whom were new to the Navy. One ship reported that over
90 percent of the officers and 42 percent of the men were members of the Naval
Reserve.

     Admiral Turner remembered that he was incredulous that at Guadalcanal the
initial landing at Red Beach was unopposed and it added to his pleasure that
on the Tulagi side, the initial landings at Haleta and Halavo were unopposed,
and at Blue Beach unopposed except for a limited number of snipers.

     Not that everything at either landing had gone perfectly.

        . . . the Neville experienced a period of waiting of 41 minutes
between the time all boats were in the water and time to commence loading
troops.  The APDs were idle 15 minutes.

     The seven-mile approach to the Line of Departure for Gavutu "in a choppy
head sea thoroughly drenched all personnel and equipment."

Minesweeping

     Since there had been many aerial photographs taken of Japanese naval and
merchant ships in various anchorages off Lunga Point and off Tulagi in the
weeks before the landings, it was known that there were generous unmined areas
in these waters.  So despite the fact that the operation order read "Water
less than 100 fathoms in depth must be presumed to be mined," it was just a
question of determining the exact boundaries of any mined areas that existed.

     The five fast minesweepers of Mine Squadron Two, Hopkins, Southard,
Hovey, Trever, Zane, were under orders to sweep in from the 100 fathom curve
toward Port Purvis in the Gavutu Island area first, then, dividing into two
groups, simultaneously sweep from the 100 fathom curve in toward Beach Red on
Guadalcanal and a thousand yard wide passage through Lengo Channel leading to
indispensable Strait.

     in order not to alert the Japanese, and not to interfere with the early
waves of landing craft, sweeping was not to start until 90 minutes after zero
hour at Tulagi (0930) and not required by the operation orders to be completed
off the Tenaru and Beach Red until 1800 on the 7th.

     The minesweeping was actually completed, with no mines swept, at 1550,
except for the area immediately off Beach Red which could not all be done
because the transports had moved into the area.

     Well before the start of minesweeping, two of these converted destroyers
were to fire concentrated fire on Bungana island for five minutes and three
ships were to concentrate on Gavutu Island for five minutes.  Then they were
to act as control ships at the Line of Departure and as salvage ships for the
Halavao, Florida Island landing.

     While the minesweepers were proceeding to their initial stations, the
Japanese gunners manning 'the 3-inch and smaller guns on or near the top of
Gavutu decided the destroyer minesweepers at 4,000 yards were worthwhile
targets and opened up with a straddle on the flagship, Hopkins (DMS-13), and
erratic fire on the others.  The Hovey (DMS-11) which "had 30 brand new men
aboard who had never heard gunfire" reported:

     During the bombardment directed against Gavutu Island by the ship
. . . enemy AA guns fired AA shells with fuses set to explode short and above
the ship. . . ."

     There was much counterbattery fire from the fast minesweepers, and some
air bombing of Gavutu before the DMS left to proceed to their initial
minesweeping stations.

     The sweeping schedule meant that during the initial hours of the landing,
the transports and cargo ships, in Group XRAY, would be discharging Marines
and cargo into boats from four and a half to five miles from the assault
beaches if the ships were to await the completion of sweeping before moving
in.  This was a serious weakness in Rear Admiral Turner's plans, not to be
repeated willingly in later operations, and remedied before the morning was
out by prompt action of Captain Reifsnider in the Red Beach area, whose War
Diary noted:

     Debarkation positions were 4 1/2 miles from BEACH RED.  Half an hour
after the initial waves had landed, the transports moved 3 1/2 miles closer to
the beach to reduce the long water ride for the Marines.

     Commander Transport's summation was on the optimistic side.  The detailed
record shows that the transport squadron's movement closer inshore was
individualistic.  The Hunter Liggett moved in at 0942.  The McCawley logged:
"1045, commenced closing beach, 1121 anchor in 23 fathoms."  The President
Adams (AP-38) "shifted inshore and anchored BEACH RED 1201."  The Barnett "at
1045 completed debarkation and proceeded to anchorage off RED BEACH."  Alchiba
(AK-23) "anchored at 1055."  Betelgeuse "anchored in 27 fathoms about one mile
off RED BEACH at 1108."  USS Libra (AK-53) logged:  "0950.  On despatch from
OTC started maneuvering inshore to 100 fathoms curve.  1125.  In compliance
with signal from OCT, moved to anchorage 2000 yards off and parallel to Beach
'Red'."  Alhena (AK-26) "at 1130, Moved in to 3,500 yards from the beach and
anchored."  The Bellatrix logged:  "1029.  On signal that the intended
anchorage off RED BEACH was not mined, crossed slowly inside the 100 fathom
curve.  1123 anchored."  But by and large, the transports and cargo ships
moved cautiously to ease the boating problem.

     Insofar as the destroyer minesweepers were concerned, their action
reports and other correspondence do not contain any world shaking "lessons
learned" or "changes recommended" for future operations.  They had done all
the chores requested in an effective manner with no fuss or feathers.  Besides
being jacks of many trades, gunfire support, control and salvage,
antisubmarine, antiaircraft, and despatch ship, they had been masters at their
basic trade, minesweeping, at least in this area of no Japanese mines.

State of the Art

     Gunfire support and air support are two of the essential ingredients of
any amphibious landing on a hostile shore.

     The elementary Japanese air and ground defenses in the Guadalcanal-
Tulagi area closely matched the elementary state of the gunfire support art in
the U.S. Navy on 7 August 1942.  And the air bombing art was judged not too
much better than elementary by some, including Rear Admiral Turner.

     Rear Admiral Turner had been in Washington when the Battles of the Coral
Sea and Midway were fought.  He read the reports of our Army Air Force and
naval aviators' bombings in some phases of those battles.  Then he read the
decoded damage reports of Japanese commanders to their superiors.  "The
difference was so great that it wasn't even understandable," as Admiral Turner
thought this point could, and should, be illustrated in this book.

     An excellent example involves the Japanese "Tulagi invasion Group" which
consisted of two minelayers, one transport, two destroyers, two subchasers and
four minesweepers.  The transport unloaded and departed.  The rest of the
force was attacked by carrier aircraft from the Yorktown on 4 May 1942.  They
reported having sunk seven ships (two destroyers, one cargo ship, and four
gunboats), forced a light cruiser to beach itself, severely damaged both a
third destroyer and a seaplane tender, which "may have been a heavy cruiser"
and damaged an 8-10,000 ton freighter.  As a matter of record, however, no
destroyers and only a total of three very small ships were sunk.  The "light
cruiser" beached, in fact, was a modest sized 1,320-ton destroyer, the 17-
year-old Kikuzuki of the 1925 class.  Her beaching was fortunately permanent.
The "cargo ship" sunk was the 264-ton converted minesweeper, the Tama Maru.
The four "gunboats" sunk were not four but two small 215-ton coastal
minesweepers.  The damaged "seaplane tender" or "heavy cruiser" was the 4,400-
ton minelayer Okinoshima.

Ships Gunfire Support

     The amphibian gunfire support organization provided five fire support
sections at Guadalcanal to make up the Fire Support Group Love, and one Fire
Support Group designated Mike at Tulagi-Gavutu.  On the Guadalcanal side,
three of the fire support sections were single ships, a heavy cruiser with two
of its observation planes; the other two sections consisted of two destroyers
each.  On the Tulagi side, there were a light anti-aircraft cruiser and two
destroyers, with two observation planes from a heavy cruiser assigned to work
with Commander Landing Force, Tulagi and this gunfire support group.

     Each of the three United States heavy cruisers assigned fire support
chores had five seaplanes.  Eight of the aircraft were allocated to control by
the Marine commanders for liaison and shore artillery observation.  One was
allocated to Commander Screening Group for anti-submarine patrol.

     There was a naval gunfire liaison party from each cruiser sent ashore
with the early landing craft boat waves.  The observation seaplanes were
required to look for and report enemy troop movements or targets, as well as
to spot the gunfire of Marine artillery and supporting ships.

     Gunfire was to start at daylight.

Gunfire-Guadalcanal

     The naval gunfire problem on the Guadalcanal side was the simple one of
destroying the anti-aircraft and coast defense guns, all above ground, in the
Kukum, Lunga, and Tetere areas.  These had been reported by the Army Air Force
B-17s flying out of the New Hebrides or Australia.  Twelve antiaircraft guns
were reported in the Kukum area.  These had been bombed numerous times by the
B-17s during the past fortnight and they were to be further attacked by naval
dive bombers from Rear Admiral Noyes's Task Group 61.1 at 15 minutes before
sunrise, occurring at 0633.

     The locations of these antiaircraft and coast defense guns were not
accurately known to the fire support ships primarily because of the absence of
good photographs and secondarily because the dissemination of photographic
interpretation had not been developed in the amphibious forces to the
necessary extent.  So all that the ships were told was that there were "shore
batteries from Lunga Point westward," or "AA guns reported vicinity Tetere,"
or "AA guns near Tenaru."  But it was presumed the coast defense guns and the
antiaircraft guns, if dual-purpose, would open fire on the ships, and that the
spotters in the cruisers' sea planes would coach the fire support ships' guns
on to them.  This contingency did not arise.

     The initial gunfire and air strikes brought these results according to
the logs being written on the flagship:

     0635. A large fire on Kekum, bearing 214 . . .

Heavy smoke bearing 210 degrees . . .

     Enemy ammunition dump at Lunga Point and supply depot at Kukum ablaze.

     Despite these early successes, Japanese antiaircraft fire from the beach
areas continued.

     0643. AA fire from beach bearing 196 degrees T.

           However, after another seven minutes of gunfire attention, the Flag
Log noted:

     0650. No gunfire from beaches.

     In addition to destroying any hidden larger guns which might take the
amphibious ships under fire while they were disembarking troops and equipment,
135 8-inch shells and 1,400 5-inch rounds were to be put on the 1,600-yard
assault area on Red Beach to a depth of 200 yards, and extending 800 yards on
both sides.  This shelling was to take place during the period Zero Hour minus
10 minutes to Zero Hour minus five minutes, to prevent the beaches from being
taken under fire by Japanese defenders.

     Three heavy cruisers and four destroyers began this concentrated firing
at 0900, as the landing craft moved smartly from the Line of Departure toward
Red Beach.  They ceased fire about 0907, and the first LCVP touched the beach
at about 0910.

     Since there was no hostile fire against the landing troops in the Red
Beach area at Guadalcanal, the second part of the close support fire plan to
put 800 rounds of 5-inch supporting fire to the east and west of Red Beach at
Guadalcanal, starting at plus five minutes after the first wave landed, was
cancelled.

Gunfire Tulagi

     The naval gunfire problem in the Tulagi area was complicated by the lay
of the land, the multiplicity and strength of known Japanese defense
positions, and the fact that the islands of Tulagi, Tanambogo, and Gavutu lay
beneath promontories of the larger Florida Island just to the north and east,
where Japanese guns could be advantageously located.

     It was known from photographic data, that the southeast end of Tulagi was
more heavily defended than other Tulagi areas.  However, to prepare for and
cover all the actual Marine landings on Florida and Tulagi islands, it was
necessary to divide the modest early morning gunfire effort between
preparatory fire on the Blue Beach and the Haleta area, and the southeast end
of Tulagi where the known defenses, including antiaircraft guns, were located.

     Preparatory gunfire was also supplied for steep hilled Gavutu and
Tanambogo, with 92 rounds of close fire support from 500 yards by the
destroyer Monssen (DD-436).  This gunfire was particularly effective at
Tanambogo the second day after a 200-round five-minute bombardment from a
respectable 4,000 yards had proven ineffective the first day.  This close fire
support by the Monssen was the first really "close up" use of the 5-inch naval
gun from a thin shelled naval ship to blast Japanese defenders from caves and
well-prepared defense positions.